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Background: For many patients with persecutory delusions, 
leaving home and going into crowded streets is a key clini-
cal problem. In this study we aimed to inform treatment 
development by determining the psychological mechanisms 
whereby busy urban environments increase paranoia. In a 
randomized design with prespecified mediation analysis, 
we compared the effects on patients of going outside into 
a busy social environment with staying inside.  Methods: 
Fifty-nine patients with current persecutory delusions, in 
the context of nonaffective psychosis, reporting fears when 
going outside were assessed on factors from a cognitive 
model of paranoia. They were then randomized either to 
enter a busy local shopping street or to complete a neutral 
task indoors. They were then reassessed on the measures. 
Results: Compared with staying inside, the street expo-
sure condition resulted in significant increases in paranoia, 
voices, anxiety, negative beliefs about the self, and negative 
beliefs about others. There was also a decrease in positive 
thoughts about the self. There was no alteration in reason-
ing processes. There were indications that the increase in 
paranoia was partially mediated by increases in anxiety 
(45%), depression (38%), and negative beliefs about others 
(45%).  Conclusions: We found that increases in negative 
affect may form an important route by which social expo-
sure in urban environments triggers paranoid thoughts. 
The study provides an illustration of how an experimen-
tal approach can be applied to help understand a specific 
difficulty for patients with psychosis. In future studies the 
effects of specific elements of the social environment could 
be tested.
Key words:  delusions/paranoia/urbanicity/anxiety/ 
depression
Introduction
In many patients with persecutory delusions, leaving their 
homes triggers paranoid thoughts. Being in busy, noisy 
places, surrounded by other people can be especially diffi-
cult. This leads to avoidance and, often, highly restricted 
lifestyles. In order to develop a precisely targeted treat-
ment for this important clinical problem, the key mech-
anisms by which paranoia is caused in these situations 
need to be identified. Such understanding may also have 
more general theoretical significance in offering an expla-
nation of the well-established finding that psychotic expe-
riences are more common in those living in urban than in 
rural settings (eg, McGrath et al1, March et al2, Vassos 
et al3, Heinz et al4). We therefore set out to determine the 
immediate effects of entering a busy urban environment 
in patients with persecutory delusions.
A reasonable starting point is the assumption that fluc-
tuations in delusional ideation—as triggered, eg, by going 
outside—are understandable in terms of activation of the 
mechanisms underlying delusions. We therefore used our 
cognitive model of persecutory delusions to understand 
the immediate effects of going into a busy urban environ-
ment.5 In this model, delusions are held to arise from an 
interaction of anomalous internal experiences, negative 
affect, and reasoning biases. It is hypothesized that indi-
viduals experience a changed and confusing anomalous 
internal state (eg, perceptual disturbances, unexplained 
arousal, or hallucinations occur). An explanation is 
needed for this ambiguous, but potentially threatening, 
event. Importantly, a negative affective state substantially 
raises the risk of a threatening paranoid interpretation. 
This may act through a number of routes. Anxiety pro-
vides the threat theme of paranoid thoughts, due to threat 
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anticipation and a bias toward negative interpretations of 
ambiguous events. Paranoid fears also build upon nega-
tive views of the self, since the person is likely to feel infe-
rior and hence apart and vulnerable. The effects will be 
enhanced by self-consciousness, an attentional focus on 
the self, increasing the sense of the self  as a target. All 
these affective biases may of course arise from past expe-
riences of real threat from others. The fears reach a delu-
sional level of conviction when reasoning biases, such as 
belief  inflexibility and jumping to conclusions (JTC), are 
present.
Drawing upon this model, it was predicted that going 
outside principally induces paranoia via the genera-
tion of negative affect. This is consistent with personal 
accounts of paranoia (eg, Adam6), and the hypothesis 
that urban environments are a stressor that engenders 
social defeat.7 Going outside is likely to cause patients to 
experience stress and hence the typical stress responses 
of anxiety and low mood. This will trigger a number of 
affective psychological processes such as threat anticipa-
tion, negative interpretations of events, negative thoughts 
about the self, and self-consciousness. In essence, there 
are changes in the contents of consciousness and the style 
of information processing that will raise the likelihood 
of paranoid ideation occurring. Principally, threat cogni-
tions will come to mind, the self  will be perceived as more 
vulnerable, and the focus of attention will be on danger.
In our pilot study 30 patients with persecutory delu-
sions were randomized, either to going outside to buy a 
newspaper in a local shop in a busy street or to a relax-
ation task.8 Afterward, they completed measures of 
paranoia, affect, and reasoning. It was found that going 
outside led to an increase in paranoia, anxiety, negative 
beliefs about others, and JTC. Reasons for the increased 
paranoia were inferred but not tested. The current study 
improves on this pilot in a number of  ways: a larger 
sample; a much more extensive assessment battery; and 
assessments carried out before and after the randomiza-
tion condition, enabling tests of  mediation. Moreover, 
the control condition was a neutral task (that was typi-
cal of  inside activity), rather than relaxation, in order to 
specify the changes directly attributable to going outside. 
We hypothesized that social exposure would increase: 
paranoia, anxiety, data-gathering biases, and cogni-
tive biases associated with anxiety (eg, threat anticipa-
tion, bias to interpret ambiguity as threat, self-focus). 
Furthermore, changes in paranoia would be mediated 
by the changes in the emotional and cognitive biases. 
The focus was on determining the psychological conse-
quences and responsible mechanisms of  the total effect 
of  going outside into a busy social environment for 
patients with persecutory delusions, and not on dissect-
ing the different contributions of  the many and varied 
elements of  the environment. The real clinical question 
of  the in toto effects of  going outside for patients was 
the target.
Methods
Participants
Sixty-one patients with persecutory delusions were 
recruited from 6 mental health sites: South London 
and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust; Barnet, Enfield 
and Haringey Mental Health Trust; Camden and 
Islington Mental Health Foundation Trust; Oxleas NHS 
Foundation Trust; Central and North West London 
NHS Foundation Trust; and North East London NHS 
Foundation Trust.
The inclusion criteria were
 • age 18–65
 • a current persecutory delusion as defined by Freeman 
and Garety10
 • the delusion occurred in the context of nonaffective 
psychosis (ICD-10, F2)
 • the delusion had persisted for at least the last 3 months
 • the belief  was held with at least 50% conviction
 • the belief  was distressing
 • the person experienced paranoia when going outside
The exclusion criteria were
 • a primary diagnosis of alcohol or drug dependency
 • presence of an organic syndrome
 • learning disability
 • insufficient grasp of English to complete the measures
Two patients did not attend appointments offered to 
complete the randomization condition.
Assessments
Paranoia Measures 
State Paranoia Six Visual Analog Scales (VAS) were 
used to assess state paranoia: (1) I am being deliberately 
harmed or upset; (2) I am being followed; (3) There is a 
conspiracy against me; (4) I am being persecuted; (5) I am 
being laughed at behind my back; (6) I am feeling under 
threat. For each item, participants rated how they were 
feeling “right now” from 0 (Not at all) to 100 (Totally). 
There was also an additional VAS for how strongly the 
person currently believed the persecutory delusion, rated 
from 0 (“Believe not at all”) to 100 (“Believe absolutely”).
State Social Paranoia Scale9 This was completed in 
relation to the last 15 min. It comprises 10 persecutory 
items (eg, “Someone stared at me in order to upset me”; 
“Someone was trying to isolate me”; “Someone had it in 
for me”; “Someone was trying to make me distressed”), 
each rated on a 5-point scale. Higher scores on the scale 
indicate greater levels of persecutory thinking. The State 
Social Paranoia Scale (SSPS) has excellent internal reli-
ability, adequate test-retest reliability, and clear conver-
gent validity with interviewer and self-report measures.
Schizotypal Symptoms Inventory—Paranoia11 This was 
completed in relation to how the person felt “right now.” 
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It has 7 items assessing paranoid thinking (eg, “I am sure 
I am being talked about behind my back” “Do you often 
feel that other people have it in for you?”), each rated on 
a 5-point scale (“not at all” to “all of the time”). Higher 
scores indicate greater levels of paranoia. The Schizotypal 
Symptoms Inventory (SSI) has excellent internal reliabil-
ity and convergent validity and good test-test reliability.
Other Psychosis Measures 
Hallucinations VAS The occurrence of hallucinations 
was assessed on VAS assessing the frequency (“How 
much of the time does it occur?”) and associated distress 
(“How much does it upset you?”), rated on 0–100 scales. 
Higher scores indicate greater hallucinatory experience. 
These were only included by the subgroup of patients 
who experienced hallucinations.
Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms,12 and 
Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms13 The 
Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS) is 
a 35-item, 6-point (0–5) rating instrument for the assess-
ment of the positive symptoms of psychosis. The Scale 
for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms (SANS) is a 
25-item, 6-point (0–5) rating instrument for the assess-
ment of the negative symptoms of psychosis. Both 
instruments were used only at the baseline assessment. 
The symptoms identified were rated over the preceding 
month. Higher scores indicate greater symptom levels.
Affective Measures 
Anxiety and Depression VAS Participants were asked to 
rate “How anxious are you feeling?” and “How depressed 
are you feeling?” from 0 (not at all) to 100 (totally).
Brief Core Schema Scales14 The Brief  Core Schema 
Scales (BCSS), developed with nonclinical and psycho-
sis groups, has 24 items assessing negative and positive 
beliefs about the self  and others each rated on a 5-point 
scale (0–4). Four subscale scales are obtained: negative 
self  (eg, “I am unloved,” “I am worthless”), positive self  
(eg, “I am respected,” “I am valuable”), negative other 
(eg, “Other people are hostile, Other people are harsh”), 
positive other (eg, “Other people are fair,” “Other people 
are good”). Higher scores indicate greater endorsement 
of items. The scale has good internal reliability, test-retest 
reliability, and convergent validity.
Self-Focus15 Three VAS assessed current focus of 
attention (“Right now my attention is focused on my 
inner thoughts and feelings,” “Right now my attention 
is focused on how I  appear to others,” “Right now my 
attention is focussed on my surroundings”). Each was 
rated on a 0 (“not at all”) to 100 (“Totally”) scale.
Threat Anticipation15 The format was derived from pre-
vious studies (ref.16). Participants had to rate how likely 
5 listed, mildly negative, events were to happen over the 
next 2 years to themselves (on a scale of 0 “not at all 
likely” to 7 “very likely”). We used 5 mild negative events 
that were not obviously paranoia-related (“Your physical 
health deteriorates,” “You will find it hard to express 
yourself  with others,” “You have too many responsibili-
ties to manage,” “You have an accident,” “You cannot 
manage your finances”). A  higher total score indicates 
higher estimates of likelihood.
Interpretation of Ambiguity17 In this task 10 ambiguous 
scenarios are presented to participants, and respondents 
answer yes or no to a possible explanation. For example: 
You go to a party at a club. While dancing, you spot an 
old friend not far away and call out. They do not reply, 
and after a moment, turn and leave the dance floor, head-
ing for the bar. You don’t call out again because it is too 
noisy. Was your friend ignoring you in the club? (Yes/No). 
Other scenarios concern, eg, giving a presentation, doing 
a DIY project, and first impressions. Higher scores indi-
cate greater endorsement of negative interpretations of 
the ambiguous events.
Reasoning Measures 
The Beads Task18 Two computerized versions of the 
probabilistic reasoning (Beads) task, with 85:15 (easy) 
and 60:40 (difficult) task ratios, were used to assess JTC. 
For example, for the easy version of the task, one jar had 
85 orange beads and 15 black beads and the other jar had 
15 orange beads and 85 black beads. Participants were 
shown pictures of the 2 jars and told that one of the jars 
would be selected at random by the computer and that 
beads would be drawn from and replaced in the selected 
jar. After each bead was drawn, participants were asked 
if  they would like to see more beads or if  they could say, 
with certainty, from which of the jars the beads were being 
drawn. Once a bead had been drawn, it was shown at the 
bottom of the screen thereby providing a memory aid. 
The key variable was the number of beads requested by 
the participant before making a decision (draws to deci-
sion). JTC was classified as requesting 2 or fewer beads.
Maudsley Assessment of Delusions19 Two of the 
Maudsley Assessment of Delusions Scale (MADS) items 
are used to measure aspects of belief  flexibility (the pos-
sibility of being mistaken, and the reaction to hypotheti-
cal contradiction). The evidence for the delusion cited by 
participants is sensitively discussed, and they are asked 
whether it is at all possible for them to be mistaken about 
their delusional belief. The interviewer then asks how 
they would react in a hypothetical situation if  some new 
evidence were to be generated which contradicts the delu-
sion. If  they report that this would alter in any way their 
level of belief, this is recorded as belief  flexibility.
The Explanations of Experiences Measure20 The 
Explanations of Experiences (EoE) measure is a structured 
interview designed to assess whether people can envisage 
alternative explanations for the evidence cited for their delu-
sion. Once the evidence for the delusion is established, they 
are asked “Can you think of any other explanations for the 
experiences that you have described? Are there any other 
reasons — other than [the delusional belief] — that could 
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possibly account for these experiences even if you think 
they are very unlikely?” The generation of any alternative 
explanation is also taken as a measure of belief flexibility.
Weschler Test of Adult Reading21 Premorbid IQ was 
estimated at baseline using the Weschler Test of Adult 
Reading (WTAR), which comprises pronouncing 50 
irregularly spelled words.
Design
The design involved random allocation between 2 experi-
mental conditions: street exposure or a neutral control 
condition. Patients attended 2 meetings to carry out the 
research. In the first, they completed the nonrepeated mea-
sures (ie, SAPS, SANS, WTAR). The actual experiment, 
including the randomization conditions, was carried out 
at the second testing session. Randomization to condition 
using an online system was carried out during this second 
session, ie, after all the baseline assessments had been com-
pleted. A sealed envelope with the randomization condition 
was only opened once all the premanipulation assessments 
had been completed during the second meeting.
For the street exposure condition, the preference was to 
use identified shopping streets in areas of relative depriva-
tion near each mental health treatment center, but we also 
used shopping streets near to a person’s home when he or 
she was unable to come to clinic settings. Identified streets 
were required to have people walking down them during 
the day, to have a bus stop with queues to walk past, and 
a supermarket shop. There was variability in the degree 
to which patients were familiar with the streets. The street 
exposure condition was designed to last approximately 10 
min, and to take place around mid-day. Participants were 
given money to go to an identified local shop to make a 
purchase for themselves (eg, milk). The research assessor 
walked part of the way and then the patient continued 
unaccompanied. For the control condition, patients sat 
in a room with the research assessor and watched mildly 
humorous television clips for approximately 10 min. 
After the randomization condition was complete, the 
assessments were repeated. The main paranoia and emo-
tional self-report measures were completed out on the 
street with the assessor for the exposure condition group. 
The second meeting could be rescheduled if  the weather 
prevented the street exposure from taking place.
The research protocol was approved by an NHS 
research ethics committee, and all participants provided 
written informed consent. The current study was 1 of 
2 separate but linked studies, employing randomized 
experimental designs to test hypothesized mechanisms of 
change in delusions, using common measures but sepa-
rate patient samples and hypotheses (see Garety et al22).
Analysis
All analyses were carried out using Stata version 13.1.23 
First a single standardized latent paranoia outcome 
measure was constructed, using the SSPS total, the SSI 
paranoia subtotal, the 6 VAS, and the conviction rat-
ing. Factor loadings for the latent paranoia variable were 
derived from the premanipulation assessment, and then 
used to calculate the factor scores at the postrandomiza-
tion condition assessment. In a conventional intention-
to-treat (ITT) approach, ANCOVA was used to evaluate 
the effect of the randomization condition on the outcome 
(paranoia) and, separately, the putative mediators (eg, 
anxiety) as dependent variables. We allowed for center 
and the baseline measures of the outcome or mediator 
(as appropriate) as covariates in these models.
Mediation analysis was performed using the causal 
mediation approach outlined in Valeri and VanderWeele24 
to investigate direct and indirect effects of the experimen-
tal manipulation on paranoia. In addition to the previous 
ITT models, this involved regressing paranoia on the ran-
domized condition and the mediators in the same linear 
model. The effect of randomized condition on the media-
tor and the effect of the mediator on paranoia are multi-
plied to estimate the indirect effect, assuming there is no 
interaction between randomized condition and mediator 
on outcome. The SEs of the direct and indirect effects 
were generated using Monte Carlo bootstrapping with 
200 replications. The proportion mediated was calculated 
as the indirect effect divided by the total effect. Since a 
variable can only be a mediator if  there is a significant 
effect of randomized condition on the mediator, media-
tion analysis was only performed when there was a sig-
nificant ITT effect on the mediators.
We performed the mediation analysis with and with-
out adjustment for baseline covariates in all 3 models. 
Estimates of the direct and indirect effects can be biased, 
even in randomized trials, when there are unmeasured 
confounders between the mediator and outcome.25 By 
including baseline measures of the outcome and media-
tors in the regression models, we attempt to control for 
these as potential confounders in order to add robustness 
to our analysis. The results presented here are of com-
plete cases, so that patients with missing outcomes or 
mediator values are not included in the analysis; we indi-
cate the numbers included in our results. This approach 
assumes that, conditional on the baseline covariates and 
randomization, the missing outcomes and mediators are 
missing at random.
Results
Basic Demographic and Clinical Data
The demographic and basic clinical data for the 
patients who completed the randomization conditions 
are reported in table  1. Diagnoses were derived using 
OPCRIT (Operational CRITeria) from the Schedules for 
Clinical Assessment in Neuropsychiatry (SCAN) inter-
views,26 with schizophrenia the most common diagnosis 
received by participants.
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Primary ITT Analysis
Table 2 shows the scores on the assessment measures pre- 
and postrandomization. Table  3 shows ITT effects on 
the outcome paranoia variable and the potential media-
tor variables, adjusting for prerandomization values 
of each measure and the recruitment center. The effect 
is the adjusted difference in the outcome means of the 
street exposure group compared with the control group 
after allowing for covariates. It can be seen that going 
out into the street led to a significant increase in para-
noia, compared with remaining inside. Not all patients 
completed all the paranoia measures, but it is notable 
that results were also significant for individual para-
noia measures such as the SSPS, n  =  54, effect  =  5.98, 
SE = 2.28, P = .012, and the SSI paranoia items, n = 57, 
effect = 2.14, SE = 0.77, P =  .007. The street exposure 
also led to significant increases in anxiety, depression, 
negative self  beliefs, negative other beliefs, and hallucina-
tions. There was a significant reduction in positive beliefs 
about the self.
Mediation Analysis
The results for the mediation analysis for the increase 
in paranoia are shown in table  4. The analyses present 
results with and without adjustment for the pretest values 
for paranoia and all the putative mediators, together with 
recruitment center, as covariates. In the adjusted analy-
sis, there was evidence of partial mediation (approxi-
mately 40%) by anxiety, negative beliefs about others, and 
depression, and, to a lesser extent (15%), negative beliefs 
about the self. The evidence of mediation was not statisti-
cally significant. In the unadjusted analysis, we observed 
larger total effects than the adjusted analysis, and found 
significant indirect effects through anxiety (P = .03) and 
depression (P = .02). In the subgroup with hallucinations, 
we also tested whether increasing hallucination frequency 
explained the increase in paranoia, but there was little 
evidence of mediation (n  =  36, mediated effect  =  0.02, 
SE = 0.05, P = .64, proportion mediated = 3.8%).
Discussion
In this study we took an experimental approach to 
understanding a key clinical problem for patients with 
persecutory delusions. In a randomized controlled 
design, symptom and mechanism measures were taken 
before and after going outside into a busy urban envi-
ronment, and compared with those taken from patients 
who remained inside. This may be framed as a paranoia 
induction method with the aim of determining the under-
lying psychological mechanisms. As predicted, patients 
who went outside experienced increased paranoia com-
pared with those who remained inside. It was also found 
that the street exposure condition was associated with 
increases in anxiety, depression, negative views about the 
self, negative views about others, and hallucinations, and 
a reduction in positive views of the self. There were, how-
ever, no differences in reasoning processes, either JTC or 
flexibility in relation to the delusional belief: this was a 
failure to replicate the result found in the pilot study.8 It 
was however consistent with patient studies that found 
JTC does not alter in response to mood induction pro-
cesses (eg, So et al27, Freeman et al28). Overall, going out-
side was associated with significant changes in affect and 
related processing, but not in reasoning styles.
Our results indicated that the increase in paranoia was 
partially mediated by anxiety, depression, and negative 
Table 1. Summary of Demographic and Clinical Data
Street Exposure (n = 28) Control (n = 31)
Age in years (SD) 43.8 (10.0) 42.9 (11.5)
Male, female (n) 14, 14 21, 10
Ethnicity (n)
 White 18 16
 Black (African, Caribbean, or British) 8 11
 Asian 2 0
 Other 0 3
Diagnosis (n)
 Schizophrenia 22 26
 Delusional disorder 3 2
 Schizoaffective disorder 1 2
Length of illness in years (SD) 15.2 (10.9) 16.5 (11.4)
Chlorpromazine equivalent dose (SD) 496.6 (502) 480.7 (366.6)
Total SAPS mean global rating (SD) 8.0 (2.8) 7.4 (2.7)
Total SANS mean global rating (SD) 6.4 (3.1) 5.8 (3.3)
Had experienced an assault with weapon (n) 12 15
Had experienced a serious assault without weapon (n) 12 14
IQ (SD) 93.9 (16.6) 94.7 (19.9)
Note: SANS, Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms; SAPS, Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms.
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Table 2. Pre- and Postrandomization Condition Scores for Each Outcome and Mediator Measure
Measure Time
Experimental Group Control Group
Mean SD Range N Mean SD Range N
Paranoia outcomes
 Paranoia latent variable Pre 0.27 1.06 −1.14, 1.73 25 −0.26 0.78 −1.12, 1.94 28
Post 0.44 1.22 −1.00, 2.59 26 −0.30 0.70 −0.99, 1.44 28
 I am being deliberately harmed or upset Pre 30.39 38.05 0–100 28 18 29.63 0–100 31
Post 35.89 38.47 0–100 28 7 17.69 0–65 30
 There is a conspiracy against me Pre 40.39 44.42 0–100 28 30.90 35.09 0–100 31
Post 39.82 39.82 0–100 28 27.87 38.08 0–100 30
 I am being followed Pre 32.89 38.06 0–100 28 19.94 28.82 0–100 31
Post 31.96 31.95 0–100 28 20.33 33.50 0–100 30
 I am being persecuted Pre 46.46 42.62 0–100 28 26.03 33.10 0–100 31
Post 35 40.69 0–100 28 21.17 32.61 0–100 30
 I am being laughed at behind my back Pre 36.71 32.88 0–100 28 22.10 27.14 0–100 30
Post 32.5 35.08 0–100 28 12.79 20.75 0–75 29
 Feeling under threat Pre 28.31 34.40 0–100 26 22.16 28.69 0–100 31
Post 38.65 37.75 0–100 26 16.73 22.90 0–75 30
 SSPS—total Pre 19.76 12.50 10–50 25 14.62 8.79 10–45 29
Post 19.68 12.22 10–50 28 11.68 5.79 10–42 31
 SPQ—total Pre 38.11 17.90 3–68 28 33.50 12.72 7–57 30
Post 40.18 20.97 2–80 28 30.00 14.46 4–55 30
 SPQ—paranoia Pre 13.57 7.08 0–24 28 11.17 4.93 1–24 30
Post 14.07 7.53 0–24 28 9.37 5.73 0–22 30
Voices
 Hallucinations Pre 323.24 96.68 100–480 21 324.67 84.72 155–500 21
Post 353.71 103.08 100–500 21 314.10 81.46 165–450 21
 Distress Pre 61.19 33.28 0–100 21 53.00 31.89 0–100 21
Post 67.81 30.01 0–100 21 51.29 27.50 10–100 21
Affective mediators
 Anxiety Pre 39.68 27.97 0–100 28 33.55 29.51 0–100 31
Post 52.68 35.62 0–100 28 23.43 26.94 0–100 30
 Depression Pre 36.04 28.71 0–95 28 26.45 23.24 0–75 31
Post 35.43 32.05 0–100 28 16.27 21.78 0–75 30
 BCSS—negative self Pre 6.79 5.48 0–18 28 7.10 5.49 0–21 31
Post 7.81 5.82 0–24 27 6.23 5.71 0–20 31
 BCSS—positive self Pre 11.79 7.54 0–24 28 9.10 5.80 0–20 31
Post 10.07 7.38 0–23 27 10.06 6.13 0–22 31
 BCSS—negative other Pre 11.18 7.21 0–24 28 9.81 6.09 0–24 31
Post 13.19 7.84 0–24 27 9.10 7.11 0–24 31
 BCSS—positive other Pre 9.11 6.25 0–22 28 10.23 6.24 0–24 31
Post 7.63 5.65 0–17 27 10.37 6.42 0–24 30
 Self  focus—inner thoughts Pre 55.29 29.45 0–100 28 51.80 29.64 0–100 30
Post 55.37 31.22 0–100 27 53.35 31.72 0–100 31
 Self  focus—how I appear Pre 40.29 30.18 0–100 28 36.23 26.85 0–75 30
Post 33.67 31.46 0–100 27 31.45 27.90 0–90 31
 Self  focus—surroundings Pre 43.11 32.03 0–100 28 37.83 26.67 0–100 30
Post 44.93 32.65 0–100 27 40.58 28.33 0–100 31
 Threat anticipation Pre 18.85 6.48 7–30 27 17.58 5.70 6–28 31
Post 19.11 5.42 8–28 27 16.84 6.03 5–26 31
 Interpretation bias Pre 4.30 2.38 0–10 27 4.39 2.49 0–9 31
Post 5.35 2.43 2–10 26 4.63 2.50 1–10 30
Reasoning mediators
 Probability of being mistaken (%) Pre 20.71 23.68 0–80 28 25.13 29.91 0–100 31
Post 10.54 16.74 0–50 28 18.83 23.88 0–80 30
 Number of beads—85/15 Pre 3.67 4.16 1–19 27 3.97 4.61 1–20 31
Post 4.26 4.71 1–19 27 5.06 5.62 1–20 31
 Number of beads—60/40 Pre 6.19 6.04 1–20 27 6.16 5.60 1–20 31
Post 6.19 5.73 1–20 27 7.00 5.84 1–20 31
Note: BCSS, Brief  Core Schema Scale; SSPS, State Social Paranoia Scale.
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schematic beliefs. The study had limited power to detect 
whether mediated effects were statistically significant, 
since our sample size had 80% power to detect only large 
indirect effects.29 However, the pattern of results is consis-
tent with increases in affect explaining a reasonably large 
degree of the difficulties of urban exposure. Interestingly 
schematic beliefs may have accounted for changes in 
paranoia, while attentional focus and threat anticipation 
did not. This is consistent with the view that urban envi-
ronments influence mental health through a process of 
social defeat,7 and the specific hypothesis that paranoia 
builds upon negative beliefs about the self.30,31 It indicates 
that interventions specifically targeted at helping patients 
with persecutory delusions to go outside (see Freeman 
et al32) may benefit from an explicit focus on views about 
the self  and others. Surprisingly, an increase in hallucina-
tions was not associated with an increase in paranoia: this 
is inconsistent with our clinical experience. This negative 
finding may perhaps be due to the fact that a fair propor-
tion of the participants did not have hallucinations, and 
Table 4. Statistical Mediation Analysis for the Latent Paranoia Outcome at Postmeasure
Mediator
Total Effect
Effect (Boot SE),  
P
Direct Effect
Effect (Boot SE),  
P
Mediated Effect
Effect (Boot SE),  
P 
Proportion  
Mediated (%) n
Anxiety 0.39 (0.16), .01 0.21 (0.16), .19 0.18 (0.11), .09 45.12 51
0.74 (0.28), .01 0.29 (0.28), .30 0.45 (0.20), .03 60.30 54
Depression 0.39 (0.16), .01 0.24 (0.14), .09 0.15 (0.11), .18 37.59 51
0.74 (0.28), .01 0.31 (0.23), .18 0.43 (0.19), .02 57.72 54
BCSS—negative self 0.39 (0.16), .01 0.33 (0.18), .06 0.06 (0.08), .48 15.00 51
0.74 (0.28), .01 0.65 (0.27), .02 0.08 (0.11), .45 11.44 54
BCSS—positive self 0.39 (0.16), .01 0.40 (0.17), .02 −0.01 (0.05), .92 −1.39 51
0.74 (0.28), .01 0.74 (0.28), .01 −0.00 (0.05). .96 −0.30 54
BCSS—negative other 0.39 (0.16), .01 0.22 (0.16), .17 0.18 (0.11), .13 44.82 51
0.74 (0.28), .01 0.44 (0.25), .08 0.30 (0.20), .13 40.27 54
Note: Within each mediator, the top row shows the adjusted analysis, the bottom row shows the unadjusted analysis. BCSS, Brief  Core 
Schema Scale.
Table 3. Effect of Street Exposure Compared With the Control Group
Measure Effect SE P 95% CI N
Paranoia
 Paranoia outcome variable 0.37 0.17 .037 0.02, 0.71 51
Affective mediators
 Anxiety 27.48 8.04 .001 11.36, 43.61 58
 Depression 12.98 5.71 .027 1.54, 24.43 58
 BCSS—negative self 1.68 0.76 .032 0.15, 3.21 58
 BCSS—positive self −2.09 0.98 .036 −4.04, −0.15 58
 BCSS—negative other 2.82 0.99 .006 0.83, 4.81 58
 BCSS—positive other −1.84 1.36 .066 −3.80, 0.13 57
 Self-focus—inner thoughts −0.36 6.99 .959 −14.38, 13.65 57
 Self-focus—how I appear −2.06 6.45 .750 −15.00, 10.87 57
 Self-focus—surroundings 1.95 7.45 .795 −13.00, 16.89 57
 Threat anticipation 1.56 1.24 .212 −0.92, 4.04 58
 Interpretation bias 0.79 0.50 .122 −0.22, 1.79 55
Reasoning mediators
 Probability of being mistaken—% −7.19 4.23 .095 −15.67, 1.30 58
 JTC—85/15 OR = 1.67 1.21 .483 0.40, 6.94 58
 JTC—60/40 OR = 1.09 0.96 .918 0.20, 6.11 58
 PM—yes/no OR = 0.60 0.35 .390 0.19, 1.91 59
 Alternative explanations OR = 0.96 0.66 .957 0.25, 3.70 56
 Hypothetical contradiction OR = 1.15 0.72 .829 0.33, 3.95 59
Voices
 Hallucination frequency—VAS 43.15 17.82 0.020 7.08, 79.22 42
 Distress—VAS 13.20 7.01 0.067 −1.00, 27.39 42
Note: BCSS, Brief  Core Schema Scale; JTC, jumping to conclusions; PM, possibility of being mistaken; VAS, Visual Analog Scale.
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that the paranoia assessments were not specifically tied to 
hallucinatory experience.
A cognitive model of persecutory delusions5,33 was used 
to derive the study hypotheses, but what does the study tell 
us about the theory? It clearly supports the central tenet 
that affect is a key factor in severe paranoia. Beliefs about 
the self  and others were the key psychological process 
identified, although this assumes there is comparability 
in sensitivity to change in the assessment of each affective 
variable. Variables such as threat anticipation may simply 
be harder to measure accurately in a questionnaire. It is 
also of note that the putative mediators covered a range 
of cognitive and emotional processes but that it would 
have been valuable to have assessed other potentially rel-
evant affective mechanisms such as worry, safety behav-
iors, and interpersonal sensitivity. Nonetheless, we can 
be reasonably confident that reasoning processes such 
as JTC, which we have shown elsewhere have adequately 
sensitive measurement to show short-term change,22 were 
not altered by social exposure. It is plausible that differ-
ent causal factors highlighted in the model come into 
action at different stages of delusional belief  formation 
and maintenance.
The sort of experimental approach we took to paranoia 
has a number of limitations. There will have been vari-
ability in the social environments that the patients were 
exposed to, and in their familiarity with them. This is, we 
hope, compensated by the ecological validity and clinical 
relevance of the procedures. Perhaps more problematic is 
that a one-off  exposure within a research protocol does 
not fully capture the reality for patients of everyday visits 
taken alone. In the experimental setting there is likely to 
be less exacerbation of paranoia, as patients take a degree 
of reassurance from the presence of the researchers; this 
is an additional constraint, together with the sample size, 
on the power of the study to detect significant effects. 
There may also be differences related to how long people 
have held their fears about going outside. We chose a neu-
tral condition that was moderately engaging for patients, 
and likely to reflect actual activity indoors, but other 
activities might have different impacts on psychological 
processes.
The mediation analysis assumes that there are no 
unmeasured confounders between the mediator and out-
come, but such confounding is possible since both vari-
ables are measured postrandomization. We attempted to 
control for some confounders by including baseline mea-
sures as covariates in the mediation analysis; however, we 
cannot rule out the presence of further unmeasured con-
founders influencing the results. Although the statistical 
analysis was consistent with the hypothesis that anxiety 
leads to paranoia, the reverse causal pathway cannot be 
ruled out since these measures were taken at the same 
measurement occasion; we cannot empirically demon-
strate which change occurred first. We note the advice of 
Bullock and colleagues34 “to think of mediation analysis 
as a cumulative enterprise.” Therefore, building upon the 
current work, an interesting future causal test would be 
to use anxiety reduction before social exposure.
The study of the psychological effects of urban envi-
ronments on patients with mental health problems is 
clearly at an early stage. Future studies could dissect 
the effects of different aspects of the environment, eg, 
between going outside into places with and without other 
people, or between noisy and quiet social situations, or 
between familiar and unfamiliar locations. Use of virtual 
reality scenarios may be helpful in this work.35 Factors 
that moderate effects, such as previous experience of 
physical attack, or social support, or working memory 
impairments, could be tested in larger studies. The effects 
of social environments on patients compared to those 
without clinical disorders would be of interest. The cen-
tral clinical question raised in the current study can lead 
to a substantial research program.
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